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AN END RUN AROUND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: THE
USE OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE UNDER THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The prosecution readily agreed not to use this evidence at
trial .... The illegally-seized evidence, however, was introduced
at the sentencing phase as 'relevant conduct' under the sentencing guidelines, and [the defendant] predictably received almost
the precise sentence he would have gotten had he been indicted,
tried, and convicted for possession of all the drugs and guns in
the apartment ....

[A] more patent end-run around the exclu-

sionary rule is hard to imagine.'
In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission, 2 acting pursuant to the congressional mandate of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984,1 promulgated a comprehensive set of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines 4 (Guidelines) to govern the imposition of criminal
sentences under federal law. These Guidelines represented a dramatic departure from the existing sentencing system for federal
crimes. 5 At the heart of the Guidelines is the computation of the
base offense level.' The Guidelines have prompted concern among
1. United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J., concurring) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992); see also United States v. Jewel,
947 F.2d 224, 238-40 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (arguing that under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, illegally seized evidence often plays a "central role" and
therefore should be excluded from sentencing determinations).
2. Congress established the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988).
3. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
4. U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL

(1991) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].

5. Commentators have noted that the Guidelines have "revolutionized sentencing in the
federal criminal justice system," William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 495
(1990), and "have dramatically changed the federal sentencing process in this country."
Helen G. Corrothers, Rights in Conflict: FairnessIssues in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 38, 38 (1990).
6. The base offense level represents the numerical weight that Congress has attached to a
specific violation committed by the offender. In combination with other factors, discussed
infra text accompanying notes 156-77, the base offense level determines the sentence the
offender receives under the Guidelines. See generally Corrothers, supra note 5, at 40-41
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observers regarding the long-term impact of their adoption upon
the criminal justice system.7 Having survived detailed constitutional scrutiny,8 the Guidelines likely will remain a permanent fixture in the criminal justice system.
One area deserving careful attention involves the effect given to
illegally seized evidence 9 under the Guidelines. The drafters of the
Guidelines did not address explicitly whether illegally seized evidence should play a role in the determination of sentences under

(discussing the overall goals of the Sentencing Commission and the general application of
sentencing principles).
7. See, e.g., MARCIA G. SHEIN & JANA L. JOPSON, SENTENCING DEFENSE MANUAL 2-9 (1991)
("The long term effects of [sentencing reform] in the criminal justice arena cannot be
judged for several decades."). Concern appears well placed. In the 1991 Crime Bill, S. 1241,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), the Senate proposed increasing the scope of federal jurisdiction
to include murders committed with guns that have travelled across state lines, as well as
expanding jurisdiction to include a larger number of drug crimes and crimes of violence. See
id. §§ 1201-1242; see also Michael Hedges & Jerry Seper, Rehnquist Rips Bills on Federal
Crimes, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at A4 (discussing proposed expansion of federal jurisdiction in the Crime Bill). As a result, the application of the sentencing guidelines would increase dramatically. Although the 1991 legislation ultimately excluded these provisions, they
are likely to reemerge in the future. See William Rehnquist, The Supreme Court and Society; Rehnquist's Reducing Plan, RECORDER, Jan. 21, 1992, at 9. As the role of the federal
government in criminal cases increases, the Guidelines are likely to become a central tool in
the punishment of felons in this country.
8. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the Sentencing
Reform Act does not violate the principles of separation of powers and excessive delegation); United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 592 (1991)
(holding that the Guidelines do not violate due process by transferring authority to the
prosecutor); United States v. Zapata-Alvarez, 911 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
enactment of the Guidelines does not violate the Presentment Clause); United States v.
Litteral, 910 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that consideration of a defendant's criminal
history in setting the sentence under the Guidelines does not violate due process or equal
protection); United States v. Woods, 907 F.2d 1540 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Guidelines do not violate the separation of powers doctrine by providing the probation officer with
a significant fact-finding role), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 792 (1991); United States v. Rivera,
898 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Guidelines do not violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel).
9. Several bases exist for finding that the police have obtained evidence improperly. For
instance, if the police obtain evidence after the initiation of an adversarial proceeding without providing the defendant with counsel, subsequent evidence they gain may be tainted
and therefore inadmissible. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The largest
category of illegally seized evidence involves items gathered in searches and seizures violating a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
In this Note, all references to "illegally seized evidence" refer only to evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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the new sentencing structure.1 0 This omission has created the
anomalous scenario wherein courts exclude illegally seized evidence
computing sentences
at trial" yet take it into consideration when
12
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
This Note first will examine the development of the exclusionary
rule and the rationales that justify its application. Next, it will analyze pre-Guidelines sentencing practices, including the treatment
of illegally seized evidence at sentencing. The Note then will discuss the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
outline the reasons behind their adoption.
This Note argues that the use of illegally seized evidence in sentencing violates the rationales justifying the exclusionary rule because the Guidelines create a unique incentive for the illegal
seizure of evidence. Namely, the greater the amount of evidence
discovered, the more severe the sentence generally will be under
the Guidelines, regardless of whether that evidence was the product of an illegal search. To deter unconstitutional searches resulting from this new incentive, courts should apply the exclusionary
rule to sentencing proceedings, thereby protecting both the goals of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Historical Background"
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
10. See, e.g., Cheryl G. Bader & David S. Douglas, Where to Draw the Guideline:Factoring the Fruits of Illegal Searches into the Sentencing Guidelines Calculations, 7 TOURO L.

REV. 1, 32 (1990) ("The Sentencing Reform Act, its legislative history, and the Guidelines
themselves are each completdly devoid of any mention of the effect that illegally obtained
evidence should, or should not, have on sentencing.").
11. The exclusion of evidence at a trial because the government acquired it through illegal
means rests upon the principles of the "exclusionary rule." See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 1.1 (1978).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 885 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 885 (1992); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1991).
13. For an excellent discussion of the development of the exclusionary rule, see Potter
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
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houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... ,,1 At the time of the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment, the authors of the Constitution gave
little thought to the appropriate remedy for a violation of the provision. 5 In fact, no clear position regarding the impact of a Fourth
Amendment violation on the admission of evidence at trial
emerged until over 100 years after the adoption of the
Constitution.' 6
In Weeks v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court firmly settled
upon the exclusion of illegally seized evidence as the remedy for
violations stemming from improper searches.' 8 The Court found
the use of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to be a serious intrusion on the constitutional rights of the accused. 19 According to the Court,
[i]f letters and private documents can thus be ... used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.2"
The Supreme Court extended the Weeks doctrine to derivative
uses 21 of illegally obtained evidence in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,'22 and in doing so, greatly enhanced the applicability of the exclusionary rule. In an opinion by Justice Oliver Wen14. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
15. See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1371-72.
16. See LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 1-6.

17. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled on other grounds by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960).
18. Id. at 398. In Weeks, federal marshals searched Weeks' home without any warrant,
thereby uncovering incriminating evidence. Id. at 386.

19. Id. at 393.
20. Id.
21. Derivative evidence is the "product of the primary evidence, [illegally obtained] or...
otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the
connection with the unlawful search becomes 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' "
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
22. 251 U.S. 385 (1920), overruled by United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that illegally seized evidence may be used to impeach a defendant's statements made
during direct examination).
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dell Holmes, the Court sharply chastised the government for its
attempt to evade the requirements of the Fourth Amendment:
The Government now, while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of
the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would
not have had.
...The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall23not be used before the Court but that it shall not be
used at all.

The exclusionary rule thus became the established mechanism
for remedying Fourth Amendment violations by federal officials.
The Court, however, did not extend the same requirements to state
proceedings until forty years later in Mapp v. Ohio.24 Departing
from earlier precedent, 25 the Court extended the remedy of the exclusionary rule to state criminal trials through the incorporation of
the Fourth Amendment by way of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 6 With the decision in Mapp, the exclu-

23. Id. at 391-92. In both Silverthorne and Weeks, the Court enunciated a doctrine that
mandated the exclusion of illegally seized papers from trial. Id. at 391-92; Weeks, 232 U.S.
at 393. In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), the Court extended this doctrine to
cover the illegal seizure of other forms of the defendant's property. Id. at 33-34.
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), the Court determined that due process did not mandate the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence at state trials. Id. at 33. Despite its refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to
state trials, the Court noted its strong support for the use of the exclusionary rule in federal
proceedings. Id. at 28.
26. According to the Mapp majority:
Since the Fourth Amendments right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule
the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a
form of words," valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as
not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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sionary rule developed as the appropriate remedy for violations of
the Fourth Amendment in both state and federal proceedings.
Purposes of the Exclusionary Rule
Courts have advanced two main justifications for the use of the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.
First, courts have argued that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from judicial proceedings will deter future illegal searches. 28
Second, supporters of the rule have pointed towards a need to protect the integrity of the judicial system by refusing to use tainted
evidence.2 9
Courts have long recognized the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule as a significant justification for the inadmissibility of
illegally seized evidence in criminal proceedings. For example, in
Illinois v. Krull,3 0 the Supreme Court stated that "the 'prime purpose' of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.' ",' The
rule accomplishes deterrence by " 'compel[ling] respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.'

"132

By extending the exclusionary rule to state trials, the Supreme
Court increased the deterrent impact of the rule. In Elkins v.
United States,3" the Court clearly denounced the practice of federal officials using evidence that state officers had illegally seized. 4
By refusing to allow federal officials to benefit from the illegal ac-

27. Justice Stewart observed that since the Mapp decision, states have dropped their
challenges to the exclusionary rule's application to state proceedings: "[I]t is interesting to
note that since the Mapp case was decided, no state official has contended that the existence of these alternative remedies [to the exclusionary rule] . . . obviates the need for an
exclusionary rule." Stewart, supra note 13, at 1388.
28. See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
30. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
31. Id. at 347 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
32. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 n.12 (1976) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
33. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
34. Id. at 221.
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tions of a state officer, the Court further reduced the incentive for
officials to act contrary to the requirements of the Constitution. 5
Proper application of the exclusionary rule is intended primarily
to deter willful conduct of the police,' 6 but does not necessarily
extend to conduct by other officials. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate
method of deterring magistrates from improperly issuing search
warrants.3 7 The Court has also determined that the exclusionary
rule is an inappropriate means of guarding against improper legislative delegation of search authority.3 ' Even when police misconduct is involved, if the search proceeded on a good faith reliance
on a facially valid search warrant, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. 9 The exclusionary rule properly focuses upon cases in which
the exclusion may "alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments."40
Justification for the exclusionary rule rests not only upon deterrence, but also upon the rule's power to protect the judicial system
from the taint of illegal evidence. Without the rule, use of illegally
obtained evidence threatens the integrity of the judicial system.
Justice Holmes argued powerfully that "no distinction can be
35. Id. at 221-22. The Court in Elkins concluded that respect for the Fourth Amendment

by federal and state officials
is hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers.., at least
tacitly to encourage .. . the disregard of constitutionally protected freedom[s].
If, on the other hand, it is understood that the fruit of an unlawful search by
state agents will be inadmissible in a federal trial, there can be no inducement
to subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal
investigation. Instead, forthright cooperation under constitutional standards
will be promoted and fostered.
Id.
36. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (stating that "evidence obtained
from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer
had knowledge... that the search was unconstitutional" (emphasis added)).
37. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (creating a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule that allows the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a magistrate that is ultimately found to be
invalid).
38. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350-52 (1987) (determining that because legislators
are immune to the effects of exclusion, the extension of a good faith exception to officers'
reasonable reliance on a properly promulgated but ultimately unconstitutional enactment is
warranted).
39. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-21.
40. Id. at 918.
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taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Government
as judge. If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to
have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge to
allow such iniquities to succeed. 4' 1 Heeding Justice Holmes' warn-

ing, the Court later attempted to exclude evidence obtained 42
by ilprocess.
judicial
criminal
the
degraded
it
licit means because
The Supreme Court, however, subsequently rejected the judicial
integrity rationale as an independent basis for application of the
any
exclusionary rule. 43 The current Court, therefore, would justify
4
use of the exclusionary rule solely upon its deterrent effect. "

Extension of the Exclusionary Rule to Other Legal Proceedings
Mapp and its progeny firmly established that the exclusionary
rule's deterrent effect justified exclusion of illegally seized evidence
41. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court offered one of the
most vigorous defenses of the judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to
lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus in our system
evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting
evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
Id. at 13.
43. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). The Court stated that:
Although our decisions often have alluded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," they demonstrate the limited role of this justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular context. Logically extended this
justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence .... The teaching ... is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be
concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has
limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
44. A third rationale for the exclusionary rule is that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right not to have illegally seized information used against him in a subsequent proceeding. See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1380-81. The Supreme Court, however, has condemned this concept. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (stating that
post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right and
is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the illegal search, for
any "[rieparation comes too late").
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from a prosecutor's case-in-chief.46 Debate arose, however, over the
extent to which the goals of the exclusionary rule required the exclusion of evidence from other legal proceedings.4 6
The Supreme Court tackled this issue in United States v. Calandra,47 which involved the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in federal grand jury proceedings. 8 Initially, the Court
noted the important role that the grand jury played in the investigation of criminal cases 49 and that grand juries had "wide latitude
to inquire into violations of criminal law," 0 justified in part by the
nonadversarial nature of the grand jury proceeding. 5 1 Because of
the investigative role that grand juries play, the subject of the
grand jury proceeding cannot attack an indictment based upon
consideration of incompetent evidence 5 2 or information taken in violation of a witness' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 3 The Court acknowledged, though, that limitations existed

45. See LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 1.4, at 58.
46. See, e.g., Charles D. Levine, The Second Circuit Review--1982-1983 Term: Criminal
Procedure: The Second Circuit Constricts the Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule, 50
BROOK.L. REv. 601 (1984); Ellen A. Schwartz, The Second Circuit Review--1981-1982 Term:
Criminal Procedure:Do Illegal Searches Warrant Exclusion from Probation Revocation
Hearings, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 1013 (1983).
47. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
48. Id. at 339. The Fourth Amendment violation in Calandra stemmed from an overly
broad search by police officers. Id. at 341. The police obtained a warrant to search Calandra's place of business for suspected gambling operations. Id. at 340. Upon conducting a
detailed search, the police failed to discover any evidence of gambling activities. Instead,
they uncovered evidence of the defendant's loansharking activities. Id. at 340-41. The government attempted to use the evidence in a grand jury proceeding, but -both the district
court and the Sixth Circuit refused to allow the use of the evidence in the grand jury proceeding. Id. at 342.
49. Id. at 342-44.
50. Id. at 343.
51. Id. at 343-44. This factor played a key role in the Court's analysis:
A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person. The grand jury's investigative
power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged.
Id.
52. Id. at 345 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)).
53. Id. (citing Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958)).
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upon the authority of the grand jury to compel information from a
witness. 4
To determine whether to affirm the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence from the grand jury, the Court propounded a balancing
test: "In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to grand
jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential
benefits of the rule as applied in this context."5 5 Under this test,
extension of the exclusionary rule threatened serious harm to the
historic role of the grand jury. 6 Weighed against this serious potential harm, the "incremental" 57 benefit to the witness "is uncertain at best."5 " Courts have applied the Calandratest to determine
the appropriateness of extending the exclusionary rule to other
criminal proceedings. Some courts have found that the Calandia
test favored the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from other
legal proceedings in addition to the exclusion from the prosecu-

54. Id. at 346-47. The grand jury cannot request information that would invade legitimate
privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906).
55. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
Permitting witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a grand jury would
precipitate adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on the merits
and would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings.... The probable result
would be "protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings," effectively
transforming them into preliminary trials on the merits.
Id. at 349-50 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 351.
58. Id. In fact, the Court concluded that extending the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings would result in no deterrent effect:
Such an extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed
toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation.
The incentive to disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment solely to
obtain an indictment from a grand jury is substantially negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution
of the search victim. For the most part, a prosecutor would be unlikely to request an indictment where a conviction could not be obtained.
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tion's case-in-chief. 5e Others have used the Calandra formula to
reject such extensions of the exclusionary rule. 0
The Supreme Court has used the balancing test announced in
Calandrato extend the exclusionary rule to bar the use of illegally
obtained evidence to impeach defense witnesses.6 ' In James v. Illinois,62 police gathered evidence against the defendant in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.6 3 Historically, illegally seized evidence
had been approved as a means of impeaching the testimony of a
defendant, thereby deterring perjury by a defendant who knew
that the prosecution could offer the evidence to contradict his false
testimony.64
In James, a majority refused to apply this exception to the exclusionary rule beyond the testifying defendant.6 5 The Court balanced the need for deterrence against the potential damage to the
judicial process resulting from exclusion of the illegally seized evidence used to impeach a defense witness.66 The Court concluded
that the judicial process gained little from allowing the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach witnesses other than the defendant.6 In contrast, the refusal to apply the exclusionary rule
59. See, e.g., United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding the exclusionary
rule applicable to probation revocation proceedings); United States v. Deak-Perera & Co.,
566 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (D.D.C. 1983) (stating that the exclusionary rule applies to compliance audits of third parties under 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1980)).
60. See, e.g., Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1982) (determining that
evidence seized illegally in a criminal proceeding may be used in a civil tax proceeding);
Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1001 (D.N.H. 1976) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to school disciplinary proceedings).
61. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1990).
62. 493 U.S. 307.
63. Id. at 309. In James, police officers lacked probable cause when they arrested the
defendant and as a result, information they obtained from him subsequent to the initial
detention was inadmissible as "fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation." Id. For a discussion
of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). The Court found that any
deterrence from the exclusion of impeachment evidence "was only a 'speculative possibility.'" Id. at 626 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)). Against this minimal benefit, the use of evidence to avoid perjury furthered the truth-seeking goals of the
court. Id.
65. James, 493 U.S. at 313.
66. Id. at 313-18.
67. Id. at 313. The Court offered three rationales for refusing to allow illegally obtained
evidence for impeachment purposes. First, witnesses more readily perceive the gravamen of
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would encourage future illegal searches by police. 8 In addition, the
Court specifically rejected the argument that limiting exclusion to
the prosecution's case-in-chief provided an adequate deterrent to
69
illegal searches.
SENTENCING PRACTICES PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES

Early common law sentencing practices focused upon legislative
attempts to set a specific punishment for each type of criminal offense.7" In response to the perceived flaws in this system,"' a flexible sentencing system developed, resting in judges and juries authority and discretion regarding the proper sentence for a particular offense.7 2 Where legislatures once had determined the ulti-

a threatened criminal prosecution for perjury than do defendants already facing the possibility of conviction for the underlying offense. Id. at 314. Second, allowing prosecutors to
use such evidence to impeach witnesses would deter defendants from calling witnesses to
the stand. Id. at 314-15. Finally, the Court did not find the potential loss of probative evidence through the exclusion of illegally obtained information persuasive. Id. at 317. In fact,
the Court issued this warning with regard to an undue emphasis on the loss of accurate
information through the exclusionary rule: "The cost to the truth-seeking process of evidentiary exclusion invariably is perceived more tangibly in discrete prosecutions than is the
protection of privacy values through deterrence of future police misconduct." Id. at 319.
68. Id. at 318 ("[Tihis expansion would vastly increase the number of occasions on which
such evidence could be used ....
[I]llegally obtained evidence holds even greater value to
the prosecution ....
).
69. Id. at 318-19. Because police officers often obtained enough evidence for satisfaction
of the obligations of the prima facie case,
[i]n these situations, a rule requiring exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
from only the government's case in chief would leave officers with little to lose
and much to gain by overstepping constitutional limits on evidence gathering.
Narrowing the exclusionary rule in this manner, therefore, would significantly
undermine the rule's ability "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it."
Id. at 319 (footnote omitted) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
70. See generally United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-52 (1978) (discussing the development of sentencing practices in the United States); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING §§ 1:1-1:3 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the history and rationale of sentencing in the
United States).
71. Critics argued that this system demonstrated "excessive rigidity." Grayson, 438 U.S.
at 45-46; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 70, § 1.2, at 6-8 (discussing the rigidity of the early
common law system).
72. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363, 365
(1989) (discussing the granting of indeterminate sentencing authority to judges).
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mate sentence, under "indeterminate sentences"7 3 they provided
only broad ranges within which a judicially imposed sentence
74
might fall.
The indeterminate sentencing system relied upon judges to evaluate the potential for rehabilitation of each defendant. 5 As a result, this system emphasized providing sentencing judges with as
much information as possible to determine the appropriate disposition. In Williams v. New York,7" the Supreme Court elaborated
on the need to provide sentencing judges with the widest possible
range of information in an indeterminate system. Unlike a trial
judge, a sentencing judge "is not confined to the narrow issue of
guilt. ' 77 Instead, in accordance with "modern concepts individualizing punishment, 7 8 judges required access to "the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. '79
These modern punishment devices, including probation and parole, "ha[d] resulted in an increase in the discretionary powers exercised in fixing punishments." 80 As a result, the Court held that a
judge could consider any information in reaching its decision with
regard to sentencing.8 '

73. CAMPBELL, supra note 70, §§ 4:1-4:3. According to Professor Campbell, indeterminate
sentences rested upon a rationale that rehabilitation of incarcerated convicts occurred while
those individuals remained in prison. Id. § 4:1, at 70. The rationale required flexibility in
sentencing so that a sentence could be reduced to the point at which rehabilitatiofi had been
achieved; the prisoner received parole at that point. Id. §§ 4:1-4:2.
74. Id.
75. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
76. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
77. Id. at 247.
78. Id.
79. Id. (footnote omitted). The Court pointed to the historic distinction between the roles
of a judge at trial and at sentencing:
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this
country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge
could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to
assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed
within limits fixed by law.
Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 249. The Court justified the use of information not admissible at trial, stating
"a strong motivating force for the changes [in sentencing'practices] has been the belief that
by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less
severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship." Id.
81. Id. at 252.
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Use of Illegally Seized Evidence in Pre-Guidelines Sentencing
Decisions
Despite the wide grant of discretion in Williams, circuit courts
confronting the realm of permissible information used in sentencing decisions split on the proper handling of information obtained
in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In
Verdugo v. United States,2 the Ninth Circuit restricted the use of
illegally seized evidence in setting an indeterminate sentence. 3
In considering the propriety of the use of the fruits of the illegal
search in sentencing, the Ninth Circuit recognized the need for a
wide range of information at sentencing as expressed in Williams. 4 The court was unimpressed, however, by the public interest in imposing an individualized sentence, the basis of the Williams decision, at the cost of tolerating the outrageous police
tactics exhibited in this case.85
As a result, the court in Verdugo found the need for deterrence
of police behavior "all too clear. 81 6 At the time the police executed
their illegal search of Verdugo's premises, they already had in their
possession sufficient evidence to convict him of one offense of drug
possession. The purpose of the additional, warrantless search,
therefore, was solely to uncover Verdugo's wholesale supply of
drugs. 8 In this situation the police had a powerful incentive to
82. 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971).
83. Id. at 613. Police arrested Verdugo after a period of observation and charged him with
sale of heroin. Id. at 609. Arriving at his house to issue the arrest warrant, the police participated in a comprehensive search of the entire house, although they lacked a warrant to
perform such a procedure. Id. at 609-10. Verdugo's conviction for selling heroin was based
solely on lawfully seized evidence, but Verdugo's sentence reflected consideration of the
money and drugs taken in the illegal search and seizure. Id. at 613.
84. Id. at 616.
85. Id. at 611.
There is undoubtedly a strong public interest in the imposition of a proper
sentence-one based upon an accurate evaluation of the particular offender
and designed to aid in his personal rehabilitation. The permissible scope of the
sentencing judge's inquiry is accordingly broad, and limitations are not lightly
imposed .... But the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing cannot
always be justified by this simple generality.
Id. Instead the court focused on the evidence gatherers' flagrant disregard for the proper
police procedures in searching the defendant's house in this case. See id. at 610.
86. Id. at 612.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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perform the illegal search.89 The court concluded that because the
police undertook the illegal search in an effort to gather information after already obtaining evidence adequate to lead to a conviction, application of the exclusionary rule in such situations would
have a necessary and deterrent effect.90
Not all courts followed the rationale set forth in Verdugo. In
United States v. Schipani,91 the court refused to exclude from its
sentencing determination information gained through illegal wiretaps.9 2 Citing a strong need for all relevant information in sentencing,93 the Eastern District of New York limited information considered in sentencing only on the ground of "[f]airness, accuracy, and
procedural due process." 94 Regarding the deterrence rationale, the
court determined that the threat of losing the evidence at trial
served as a significant deterrent to illegal police searches. 5 Finally,
89. According to the court,
The range of possible penalty was wide-five to twenty years. The length of
Verdugo's sentence would be quite different if it could be shown that Verdugo
was involved in the narcotics traffic on a large scale rather than merely as the
seller in a single small transaction.
If the fruits of the search could be used to enhance the sentence, the possibility that the evidence might be excluded at trial would be of little importance
in view of the untainted evidence available to establish the July 28 offense.
Unless the evidence were unavailable for the sentence as well as conviction, the
agents had nothing to lose by risking an unlawful search: if the motion to suppress were denied, Verdugo could be convicted of an additional offense; if it
were granted, the sentence on the original charge could still be enhanced.
Id. (footnote omitted).
90. Id.
91. 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y 1970), aff'd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
983 (1971).
92. Id. at 260. The illegal evidence stemmed from improper wiretaps on the defendant's
telephone. Id. at 255. The information obtained in those wiretaps indicated that the defendant was a career criminal and resulted in the defendant receiving a sentence near the highest permissible range allowed by law. Id.
93. Id. at 255-56.
94. Id. at 256. Under this standard, the only basis for challenging the use of particular
information at sentencing is the determination that the evidence was "extensively and materially false." See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
95. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. at 258. The court observed:
On principle, exclusion of illegally seized evidence on sentencing would seem to
be generally unwarranted. In unlawfully searching and seizing property or conversations the government runs the risk at trial that its entire case against the
defendant will be found to have been irrevocably tainted and that the evidence
obtained against him-as part of a general criminal investigation-will be held
inadmissible.... Absent some specific situation, no appreciable increment in
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the court distinguished Verdugo and limited that case to its particular facts.9 According to the court in Schipani, the unique role of
a trial judge in sentencing decisions demanded unfettered access to
all information regarding the defendant in order to reach the ap97
propriate decision.
After the Supreme Court's ruling in Calandra,the Ninth Circuit
again inquired into the continuing validity of the Verdugo rule.9 8
In United States v. Vandemark,9 9 the court examined the need to
exclude illegally seized evidence at sentencing under the Calandra
framework. 10 0 Under Calandra,the court determined that the exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence forced a significant detrimental effect upon the sentencing court,'0 ' especially in cases re-

deterrence would result from applying a second exclusion at sentencing after
the rule has been applied at the trial itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id. According to the court, "The case now before us differs substantially from
Verdugo. The evidence excluded at trial was gathered in a basic investigation of the defendant and a number of suspected members of an organized crime syndicate. It was offered to
support all of the counts of the indictment .... ." Id. at 259.
97. Id. at 259-60. The court described at length the "practical considerations" affecting
the decision to consider illegally seized evidence. Id. at 259. First, because of the discretion
that a judge has in fixing the sentence, the reasons behind the decision "will rest on the
application of unarticulated principles and factors lying at the threshold of the conscious."
Id. Requiring a judge to exclude all illegally seized evidence from the sentencing procedure
would call for a "judge to explain the basis of his decision." Id. Second, a required exclusion
of illegally seized evidence would be impossible in practical terms.
It would be almost impossible for a district judge, who has screened proffered
evidence on the motion to suppress, to banish it entirely from his mind at
sentencing .... An impractical rule of total suppression would almost invite
self-deception by a judge forced to deny that he had considered a factor that
was strongly influencing [him].
Id. at 259-60.
98. Prior to Calandra,the Ninth Circuit had reaffirmed Verdugo. See United States v.
Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1971).
99. 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1975). The facts in Vandemark provide a different setting
than Verdugo. In this case, the defendant was on probation for a drug conviction when
police arrested him for possession of marijuana. Id. at 1020. The police search that formed
the basis of this arrest violated the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and, as a result,
the government brought no charges against the defendant for this offense. Id. However, the
probation officer assigned to Vandemark's case referred this information to the presiding
judge who revoked probation and sentenced the defendant to incarceration. Id.
100. Id. at 1021.
101. Id. The description of the detriment focused on the sentencing judge's role in the
indeterminate sentencing scheme. "It deprives the district judge of information necessary to
effectuate the federal policy of individualized sentencing .... A sentence can be properly
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garding the revocation of probation.10 2 The court deemed the
concomitant gain in deterrence through the exclusion of evidence
to be "slight."' 1 3 As a result, the court concluded that " '[i]f the
additional evidence was not required for conviction, both the deterrent effect of the exclusion of illegally seized evidence of the
same offense at sentencing and the incentive to conduct legal
searches to obtain such evidence would appear to be minimal.' "1104
The Court rejected a broad interpretation of the Verdugo rule for
a narrower interpretation limiting exclusion of illegally seized evidence to cases in which exclusion would maximize the incremental
deterrent effect. 10 5
Despite attempts to discard the doctrine, the Verdugo rule remained viable.' 0 6 Even under the indeterminate system that gave
sentencing discretion to the judge, courts realized that illegal
searches aimed at influencing sentencing decisions needed the deterrent imparted by the exclusionary rule.10 7 The incidents that al-

tailored to fit an individual defendant only to the extent that the judge is aware of the
major facts relevant to needed correction." Id. This broad statement directly conflicts with
the rationale expressed in Verdugo that exclusion of illegally seized evidence did not violate
the requirements of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See supra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text.
102. Vandemark, 522 F.2d at 1021-22.
103. Id. at 1022. The officers arresting Vandemark did not know of his status as a probationer; therefore, the exclusion of information at sentencing would have little effect upon
police behavior because their primary focus would be upon trial and not sentencing. Id.
Furthermore, unlike Verdugo, in which the search was "blatantly illegal," id. at 1023, the
improper police search in Vandemark was "not intrusive." Id.
Other courts have concurred that excluding illegally seized evidence at sentencing under
the pre-Guidelines system achieves no additional deterrent effect. See, e.g., United States v.
Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
104. Vandemark, 522 F.2d at 1024 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Verdugo v. United
States, 402 F.2d 599, 612 n.21 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971)).
105. Id. at 1024-25. After Vandemark, courts expressed little reluctance in finding illegally seized evidence admissible at sentencing because refusing to admit it provided no deterrent impact upon police behavior. As a result, courts could not expect exclusion of information at sentencing to deter officers proceeding upon facially valid warrants from improper
action. See United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1981). The ruling in Leon
solidified this trend in finding that technical violations of warrant requirements were not an
appropriate basis for the application of the exclusionary rule. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
106. See United States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870, 873-76 (10th Cir. 1986) (recognizing a
narrow interpretation of the Verdugo rule but distinguishing facts from Verdugo because no
improper motive for the search was evidenced).
107. See id.
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lowed for the application of the Verdugo rule, however, rarely
arose because the indeterminate sentencing system, with its disparate results, did not lend itself to retrospective inquiry into the
basis of the sentence imposed. 108
Congressional Approval: 18 U.S.C. § 3661
In 1970, Congress codified the courts' tolerance of the broad inclusion of all information in sentencing decisions. 0 9 This section,
entitled "Use of information for sentencing," states that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for
the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."" 0 Although
lawmakers originally aimed specifically at organized crime activities in enacting the legislation,"' the legislative history indicates
that Congress intended the statute to cover all sentencing deci-

108. See Corrothers, supra note 5, at 45 (stating that under the indeterminate sentencing
system, judges had no obligation to reveal the basis of the sentence they imposed on a
defendant).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988)). Congress enacted
§ 3577 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(1970).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3661.
111. The stated purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act outlines several rationales
for the legislation, all focusing on restricting the spread of organized criminal activities. 84
Stat. 922-23. Congress concluded that "organized crime continues to grow because of defects
in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 84 Stat. 923 (emphasis added).
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sions. 112 Courts examining this statute have agreed with the broad
reading of the statute's coverage."'
In drafting this statute, Congress codified the authority the
Court gave to sentencing judges in Williams v. New York." 4 The
drafters explicitly referred to Williams as the basis for 18 U.S.C. §
6
3661,115 and the Supreme Court has read the statute similarly."
Therefore, the continued wisdom of this statute depends upon the
enduring relevance of Williams.
Section 3661, along with the judicial authority discussed above,
has served as the basis for broad usage of illegally seized evidence
7
in sentencing decisions."

112. In the debate over the adoption of this Act, Senator Kennedy, a sponsor of the legislation, introduced an amendment to "limit the sentencing provisions of title X to organized
crime offenders." 116 CONG. REC. 845 (1970) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy
observed:
The dangerous special offenders of title X are a dramatic new departure for
Federal law. Yet they are not limited to the area which the Judiciary Committee studied for so long-organized crime. They can be applied to any major
Federal crimes .... Now perhaps this is good. Perhaps the special sentencing
procedure should apply to all major Federal crimes. But certainly this is not a
question which has been studied by the committee.
Id.
In response, some Senators expressed fear that omission of certain crimes from the statute would provide a loophole for organized crime to exploit. Senator McClellan stated: "We
might be able to identify some of the areas in which organized crime is active today, but
what it might be doing tomorrow may be something else." Id. (statement of Sen. McClellan). Senator McClellan's comments clearly indicate that the presumed impact of the bill
would fall on organized crime figures: "If there is any group, any category that we ought to
deal with from a broad standpoint, it is those engaged in organized crime." Id. at 846.
The Senate, however, defeated the Kennedy amendment by a vote of 62-11, id. at 849,
thereby extending 18 U.S.C. § 3577 to all sentencing decisions.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that although § 3661 was a part of a package of special offender statutes, the text of the statute
gives no indication that Congress intended to restrict § 3661 to special offender cases).
114. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
115. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., tit. X, § 1001 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4040 (citing Williams as sole authority).
116. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 567 n.7 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[Section 3577], however, was merely a codification of the sentencing standards set forth in
Williams v. New York.").
117. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding the use
of illegally seized evidence for sentencing purposes under § 3661 and prior precedent).
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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Promulgation of the Guidelines
In response to the longstanding criticisms of the indeterminate
sentencing system,"" Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984.11 The legislation represented "the first comprehensive
sentencing law for the Federal system"' 2 and was the culmination
of over a decade of careful study by Congress.' 2 '
The adoption of the Act represented a dramatic rejection of the
previous sentencing system. Congress strongly criticized the goal of
indeterminate sentencing,' 2 2 the unbridled discretion of judges, 2 '
and the disparity in sentences that similarly situated defendants
received. 2 4 To remedy these deficiencies, Congress presented four
well-defined goals for the new sentencing legislation. First, the legislation should contain a comprehensive, consistent statement of
the federal law of sentencing, including the purposes of the sentencing system. 2 ' Second, it should assure fair treatment in the
sentencing process.'2 6 Third, all participants in the system should
know the reasons for the sentence, and they should know that the

118. For enunciation of these criticisms, see, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29-40 (1972).
119. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3673 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
120. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220,
3220.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221. Rehabilitation as the purpose of
sentencing received little praise. "[A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system
now doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now
quite certain that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated." Id.
123. This area formed one of the central themes of the new legislation. As the Senate
Report succinctly stated:
[Under indeterminate sentencing], each judge is left to apply his own notions
of the purposes of sentencing .... These [resulting] disparities [in sentencing],
whether they occur at the time of the initial sentencing stage or at the parole
stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on
those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing
the sentence.
Id. at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221 (footnote omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3222.
126. Id.
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imposition of that sentence is certain. 127 Fourth, it should assure
28
the full range of sentencing options.1
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 represented the embodiment of these goals. In the Act, Congress clearly articulated the
factors that judges must consider in rendering a sentencing decision. 29 These factors govern the determination of sentences for a
violation of any federal criminal statute. 130 Unlike under the prior
sentencing system, individual judges would not weigh these factors
in an ad hoc fashion. Instead, the Act provided for the creation of
a set of guidelines that would reflect the appropriate sentence for a
particular crime.' 3 ' The guidelines would determine the appropriate sentence unless the sentencing court found that the formulation of the guidelines did not consider adequately the existence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 3 2
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 specifically adopted the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 into the new system, continuing to allow
for the consideration of a broad range of information at sentenc-

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988). Those factors were:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to the criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kind of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as
set forth in the guidelines ...
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission...
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Id.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (1988).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
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ing. 1 3 Section 3661 thus became part of the Sentencing Reform
Act with no discussion of the continued need for the section appearing in either the congressional debate or the text of the
statute.
The task of implementing these broad policy goals of the Sentencing Reform Act fell upon the newly created United States Sentencing Commission (Commission).3 The Commission received
among its main responsibilities the task of promulgating the guidelines for use by the federal courts in the determination of criminal
sentences" 35 and issuing general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation." 6
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines represent the completion of
these responsibilities. Besides laying out a comprehensive plan for
computing sentences for most major federal crimes,"17 the Guidelines settle several key questions regarding the goals of the new
sentencing scheme and the mechanism for achieving those ends.
The Guidelines identify three major goals of the determinate" 8
scheme: honesty, uniformity and proportionality.'3 9 The Guidelines
achieve honesty in sentencing by abolishing parole and requiring
the Guideline sentence to be the actual sentence that a defendant
serves. 140 Uniformity was not an absolute goal of the sentencing

133. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch.2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987,
2010-11 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3661).
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). As one of its specific responsibilities, the Commission must
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.
Id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
135. Id. § 994(a)(1).
136. Id. § 994(a)(2).
137. See Corrothers, supra note 5, at 41.
138. The Guidelines adopt a determinate sentencing structure in that they assign a fixed
sentencing range for each offense, as compared to an indeterminate scheme, in which only
general statutory limits are fixed. Compare supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (discussing indeterminate sentencing) with CAMPBELL, supra note 70, § 4.4 (discussing determinate sentencing).
139. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A3 (1991).
140. See id.
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scheme; instead it mandated "narrowing the wide disparity in
sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses.' 141 Proportionality
required "a system that imposes appropriately different sentences
for criminal conduct of differing severity.' 14 The Commission realized that a conflict existed between the goals of uniformity and
proportionality. 43 Congress, though, clearly required uniformity
for similar offenses.14 An evaluation of the Guidelines must therefore consider their ability to achieve these competing aims."45
The Guidelines also consider the type of behavior relevant in determining the appropriate sentence. Two options were available to
the Commission. The first, a "real offense" sentencing scheme,
based the sentence upon "actual conduct in which the defendant
engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted."' 46 The other, a "charge offense" system, relied "upon the
conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense for which the
47
defendant was charged and of which he was convicted."
The Commission considered the choice between the real and
charge offense systems to be "[o]ne of the most important questions for the Commission to decide."" 4 Initially, the Commission
proposed a pure real offense system."49 The Commission rejected
this idea as unworkable for practical reasons, and because the sys' 50
tem "risked return to wide disparity in sentencing practice.'

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. "There is a tension, however, between the mandate of uniformity and the mandate of proportionality. Simple uniformity ... destroys proportionality." Id.
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988) (requiring that the maximum sentence in a particular range not exceed the minimum sentence of a range by more than the greater of 25% or
six months).
145. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A3.
In the end, there was no completely satisfying solution to this problem. The
Commission had to balance the comparative virtues and vices of broad simple
categorization and detailed, complex subcategorization, and within the constraints established by that balance, minimize the discretionary powers of the
sentencing court. Any system will, to a degree, enjoy the benefits and suffer
from the drawbacks of each approach.
Id.
146. See id. ch.1, pt. A4(a).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. In fact, the pre-Guidelines system "was, in a sense, this type of system." Id.
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Due to these problems, when the Guidelines reached Congress,
they contained a charge offense system with specific real offense
exceptions. 151 In adopting the basic charge offense scheme, the
Commission readily acknowledged the drawbacks of that system as
well.' 52
A second important consideration by the Commission involved
the grounds upon which a judge could justify a departure from the
suggested guideline range. Congress expressed its intent by stating
that the Guidelines generally govern criminal behavior unless aggravating or mitigating circumstances not adequately taken into
consideration by the Commission are present. 53 According to the
Commission, "each guideline ... carv[es] out a 'heartland,' a set of

typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes."' 54 In the Commission's opinion, the use of this departure
procedure will be infrequent and constitute the unusual case."'
Application of the Guideline Requirements
The Guidelines provide a detailed process for computation of
the sentence in a particular case. Examining the procedure for determining the sentence in a typical case is important in order to
understand the impact of illegally seized evidence under the
Guidelines.
The Guidelines provide a multistep process for computing a sentence. 15 First, the court must determine the applicable offense
guideline.5 7 The Guidelines require using the offense of the con151. Id. Among these exceptions are the role the defendant played in the offense, the
presence of a gun, and the amount of money taken by the defendant. Id.
152. Id. "One of the most important [drawbacks] is the potential it affords prosecutors to
influence sentences by increasing or decreasing the number of counts in an indictment." Id.
One limitation on this power stemmed from the nature of the judicial process. "Of course,

the defendant's actual conduct (that which the prosecutor can prove in court) imposes a
natural limit upon the prosecutor's ability to increase a defendant's sentence." Id.
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
154. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(b). The Commission further defines an atypical case as one "to
which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs
from the norm." Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. § 1BI.1.
157. Id. § 1Bl.1(a).
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viction to determine the appropriate offense guideline. 5 8 Next, the
Guidelines require that the judge determine the particular guideline range, 159 also referred to as the base offense level, using the
relevant conduct of the defendant. 6 0 Generally, application of the
relevant conduct standard does not require the conviction of the
defendant on a charge before the use of that information in calculating the appropriate sentencing range.'"' However, the scope of
information guiding the determination of the appropriate sentencing range is more narrow than that influencing the selection of a
particular spot within that range. 62 As a result, although the
158. Id. § 1B1.2(a). This section defines "offense" as "the offense conduct charged in the
count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted." Id. However,
if the defendant accepts a plea bargain or pleads nolo contendere,different rules may apply.
See id. § 1B.2(a)-(b).
To aid in the determination of the appropriate offense guideline, the Guidelines provide a
table that identifies offenses in the United States Code with their appropriate guideline
section. U.S.S.G. app. A.
159. Id. § 1B1.2(b).
160. The section of the Guidelines "Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the
Guideline Range)," reads in part:
(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless otherwise specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline specifies more than
one base offense level, (ii) specific offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the basis of the following:
(1) all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or
for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during
the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or
in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense,
or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which §3D1.2(d) would
require grouping of multiple counts, all such acts and omissions that were part
of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
conviction; ...
Id. § 1B1.3.
When the Guidelines specify only one base offense level and require no specific offense
adjustments, the court will determine the defendant's sentencing range by the base offense
level for that offense, and will consider no other conduct. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5,
at 503-21.
161. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 5.
162. See id. § 1B1.3 cmt. (backg'd.). The commentary distinguishes between this section
and § 1B1.4. "This section prescribes rules for determining the applicable guideline sentencing range, whereas §lB1.4 (Information to be Used in Imposing Sentence) governs the range
of information that the court may consider in adjudging sentence once the guideline sentencing range has been determined." Id. However, the background commentary clearly indicates that "[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of
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Guidelines initially focus on the offense of conviction for establishing the range of the defendant's sentence, 163 in cases in which the
relevant conduct of the defendant affects the calculation of the
base offense level,1 4 the determination of the defendant's relevant
conduct plays a key role in the sentence received.
After the initial determination of the base offense level, 165 the
court adjusts that level using any specific offense characteristics
applicable to that offense. 66 After the specific offense adjustments,
other adjustments to the base offense level may be appropriate
based upon the victim's characteristics, the role of the defendant
in the offense, any obstruction of justice, and the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. 6 7 The final step in the computation of
the base offense level requires repeating these steps for multiple
counts and aggregating the total value.6 " Next, the Guidelines require the determination of the defendant's criminal history.' The
court must adjust the criminal history score as required for career
offenders and defendants making their livelihood in criminal
70
enterprises.
The key variable in the determination of a sentence under the
Guidelines is, in most cases, the calculation of the base offense
level. For most crimes, the statutory range within which a sentence
must fall is wide, 171 with few restrictions. 1 2 The sentence range
that a defendant will receive is determined by the intersection of

conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range."

Id. (emphasis added).
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
165. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 cmt. 2.
166. Id. § 1B1.1(b). For example, if the offense involved a bank loan officer's receipt of
gifts under 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1988), the applicable base offense level would be eight. See
U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1. If the bribe totalled more than $1,000,000 or threatened the safety of a
financial institution, the Guidelines have two specific adjustments for that crime that would
raise the base offense level to 24. See id. § 2B4.1(b)(2)(A)-(B).
167. Id. § 1B1.1(c),(e).
168. Id. § 1131.1(d). A discussion of the principles and issues involving multiple counts is
beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, examples in this Note will not include multiple
counts.
169. Id. § 1B1.1(f). The defendant's criminal history is calculated under id. §§ 4A1.1-.2.
170. See id. §§ 1B1.1(f), 4B1.1-.3.
171. For instance, the sentencing spectrum for possession of counterfeiting equipment, a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 642 (1988), is from 0 to 10 years in prison and/or a fine not more
than $5,000. For drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988), the range is even wider,
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his criminal history and base offense level on the sentencing table. 173 The criminal history calculations involve little discretionary
judgment. 74 As a result, alterations in the base offense level dramatically affect the severity of a defendant's penalty under the
17 5
Guidelines.
After determining both the offense level and criminal history
level, the court locates the sentencing range on the sentencing table. 7 6 The range identified on the sentencing table represents a
span of months within
which the judge properly may place the de77
sentence.
fendant's
The following examples illustrate the application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines scheme. Defendant A is arrested and convicted for sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2243(a). 7 8 Under section 2A3.2 of the Guidelines, a violation of

depending upon the amount of drugs involved in the violation. The potential range is zero
to life. See id. § 841(b).
172. One key restriction on the ability of the Guidelines to determine sentence length
exists when Congress has imposed mandated maximum and minimum sentences. For instance, for the drug offenses described supra in note 171, minimum sentences are ordered
following a conviction for certain types and amounts of drugs. A defendant who is convicted
of intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base must receive a sentence of at least
10 years in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). If the defendant is convicted of the same
violation with the intent to distribute five grams of cocaine base, the minimum sentence is
five years imprisonment. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B). For a full discussion of the impact of
mandatory minimum sentences upon the Guidelines, see Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commissions' "Mandatory Guidelines," 4 Fed.
Sent. Rep. 129 (1991).
173. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
174. The Guidelines do, however, allow a departure from the criminal history category
when it does not "adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct." Id. § 4A1.3; see also United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding to the district court because the trial judge did not state sufficient, valid reasons for a
downward departure from the criminal history category).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Sleet, 893 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that 396 grams
of cocaine, seized six days after defendant's charged offense of possession of 26 grams of
cocaine, was properly considered in elevating the base offense level from 4 to 22, resulting in
51 months imprisonment). Without the consideration of the additional cocaine, defendant's
possession of 26 grams would result in an offense level of only 14, with a sentence ranging
from 15 to 21 months imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(15); see also id. ch. 1, pt. A4(h)
("[a] change of six levels roughly doubles the sentence irrespective of the level at which one
starts").
176. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
177. Id.
178. This section, entitled "Sexual abuse of a minor or a ward," states:
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that statute carries a base offense level of fifteen.7 9 Assuming that
Defendant A is a first-time offender and no other adjustments are
appropriate, 180 the appropriate sentence range is eighteen to
twenty-four months in prison.' A judge is free to select a point
within that range at which to place the ultimate sentence. 2
A more complicated application of the Guidelines involves drug
offenses. Defendant B is arrested for the possession of drugs. At
the time of the arrest, the police legally seize several plastic bags of
powdered cocaine from Defendant B. During this lawful search,
the police discover an unregistered firearm in Defendant B's possession. The police determine that the plastic bags contain twentyfive grams of powdered cocaine. The government convicts Defendant B of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).1 3 Defendant B has no prior
criminal record.
The Guidelines provide a detailed scheme for calculating
sentences involving drug offenses. 4 To compute Defendant B's
base offense level, the Guidelines look to the amount of drugs the
offense involved. 8 5 If Defendant B's relevant conduct involved no
other drugs,18 6 the base offense for this crime is fourteen. 8 7 This

Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another
person who (1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years;
and
(2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging;
*..shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2243(a).
179. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(a).
180. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text. This example also assumes no
mandatory minimum sentence applies. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
181. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
182. See id. § 1B1.4.
183. That section states in part that "[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it shall
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense ... a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988).
184. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
185. See id. § 2D1.1(c).
186. See id. § 1B1.3; see also supra note 160 and accompanying text. The defendant's
involvement with other drugs would be relevant conduct under the Guidelines under two
theories. First, it is relevant if the drugs were involved in the "commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection
or responsibility for that offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense."
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

1992]

END RUN AROUND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

269

base offense level will increase to sixteen as a result of Defendant
B's possession of a firearm, because the Guidelines designate a specific offense adjustment for this violation. 8" Assuming no other adjustments are applicable, 1 9 Defendant B's sentence will be between twenty-one and twenty-seven months in jail. 90
The typical scenario of a drug conviction, in which both the
amount of contraband involved and the defendant's related conduct directly impact the sentence, illuminates the potential implications of allowing the consideration of illegally seized evidence in
determining sentencing under the Guidelines.
Cases Involving the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence Under the
Guidelines
United States v. Torres
In early 1991, the Third Circuit examined the use of illegally
seized evidence under the Guidelines in United States v. Torres.'9'
The Guidelines give an example to clarify the application of the relevant conduct section
involving the possession of drugs:
Defendants H and I engaged in an ongoing marijuana importation conspiracy
in which Defendant J was hired only to off-load a single shipment. Defendants
H, I and J are included in a single count charging conspiracy to import marijuana. For the purposes of determining the [base] offense level under this
guideline, Defendant J is accountable for the entire single shipment of marijuana he conspired to help import and any acts or omissions in furtherance of
the importation that were reasonably foreseeable. He is not accountable for
prior or subsequent shipments of marijuana imported by Defendants H or I if
those acts were beyond the scope of, and not reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity he agreed to jointly undertake ....
Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. le.
Conduct is also relevant.under § 1B1.3 if it involves multiple offenses under § 3D1.2(d)
and entails acts or omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. See id. § 1B1.3(a)(2). This section enjoys broad
application in that the multiple offense involved in this section need not be for a conviction
for a similar offense. See id. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2; see also United States v. Sleet, 893 F.2d 947
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Smith, 887 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1989).
187. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1(c)(15).
188. Id. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
189. Other adjustments might include, for example, an increase to Defendant B's base
offense level if he had been selling drugs near a "protected location," such as a school. See,
e.g., id. § 2D1.2.
190. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
191. 926 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1991).
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Based on an informer's tip, Drug Enforcement Agency officers performed a warrantless search of an apartment in Cliffside, New
Jersey, uncovering 198 grams of cocaine. 192 While they were performing that search, an automobile arrived in which the defendant
was a passenger; an illegal search of the car revealed an additional
kilogram of cocaine. 193
On pretrial motion, the court granted Torres' request to suppress the kilogram of cocaine found in the car. 9 4 The defendant
then entered into a plea bargain, with a stipulation that "[t]he
amount of cocaine involved in the offense for purposes of calculating the applicable sentencing guideline range is 100 to 200
grams."' 9 5 At sentencing, however, the district judge accepted the
recommendation of the probation officer who had prepared the
presentence report to base the sentence upon both the stipulated
amount and the kilogram of illegally seized cocaine.'
In upholding the sentence, the Third Circuit commented that
evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment often retained a high degree of reliability. 197 The court concluded, therefore, that the primary basis for exclusion of the evidence must be
its deterrent effect. 9 8 In the context of sentencing decisions, the
court found the incremental deterrence meaningless. 199 The court
balanced the limited deterrent of exclusion against the traditional
liberality granted a sentencing court in receiving evidence to reach
its decision. 20 0 On appeal, the court gave no consideration to the

192. Id. at 322.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The circuit court does not reveal how the judge calculated the sentence. The
decision, though, clearly implies that the trial court included the seized evidence under the
relevant conduct provison of the Guidelines. See id. at 324; see also supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
197. Id. at 323.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 324-25. The court referred to the authority of both Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949), and 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) to support its position. Torres, 926 F.2d at 324.
According to the court, the only limitations on a court's receipt of evidence are that the
information be reliable and that the court not consider impermissible factors such as race or
religion. Id.
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scenario raised in Verdugo.201 The court allowed the defendant to
withdraw his plea, however, due to the unexpected result of the
bargain. 0 2
United States v. Lynch
The Eleventh Circuit confronted similar issues in United States
v. Lynch. 20 3 In the course of a six-week undercover narcotics inves-

tigation, the Tampa Police Department gathered information indicating the defendant's participation in a conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. 204 When a proposed undercover drug purchase fell
through, the police arrested the individuals involved in the conspiracy. °5 The police arrested Lynch while making a warrantless
entry into his home, seizing two handguns upon entrance.20 6
At trial, Lynch was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and possession
with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine.107 In computing Lynch's sentence under the Guidelines, the judge included
a specific offense characteristic relying upon the illegally seized
handguns. 0 8
In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings, the court of appeals turned to Calandra for authority. 09 The court concluded that the extension of the exclusionary rule would disrupt the historic role of the court in sen201.
202.
203.
204.

Torres, 926 F.2d at 325; see supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
Torres, 926 F.2d at 325-27.
934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992).
Id. at 1228-29. Prior to the illegal search, the undercover officer knew that the de-

fendant had allowed his co-conspirators to use the defendant's house to plan a drug sale,
that he used drugs at this location, that he suggested the undercover agent wait at the
defendant's house for the arrival of the drugs to speed up the transaction, and that he had
drug paraphernalia and firearm ammunition in the house. Id. at 1228.
205. Id. at 1229.
206. Id. The court concluded that this entry violated Lynch's Fourth Amendment rights
because no exigent circumstances existed justifying the warrantless entry. Id. at 1232-33. In
reaching this decision, the court overruled the finding of the trial court, which admitted the
weapons into evidence. Id. at 1229. Because Lynch was acquitted of the firearms charge,
however, the error proved harmless. Id. at 1233-34.
207. Id. at 1229.
208. Id. The increase stemmed from the application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Lynch, 934
F.2d at 1229 n.3.
209. Id. at 1234.
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tencing.2 1 0 Because "[iut is unrealistic to assume that the threat
that a future sentence might be less severe would significantly deter such lawlessness," ' the increased deterrent effect of exclusion
at sentencing was insignificant.2 12 As a result, the court refused to
exclude the illegally seized evidence from sentencing.
United States v. McCrory
In United States v. McCrory,21 3 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia encountered the starkest disparity in sentencing alternatives resulting from the consideration of illegally seized
evidence at sentencing. McCrory offered to sell several plastic bags
of cocaine to undercover police officers.2" 4 The officers purchased a
bag of cocaine from the defendant and after determining the purity of the cocaine, radioed an arrest team to apprehend him.2 15
The arrest team approached the defendant's reported location and,
without a warrant, forcibly entered the apartment and detained
and searched McCrory. 16 The search uncovered a significant
amount of crack cocaine at the apartment.2 1 7 Because the search
was illegal, the government agreed not to introduce the evidence in
the prosecution unless McCrory testified.2 18
At trial, McCrory was found guilty on one count of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a). 19 The presentence investigation report recommended a
base offense level of eighteen. 22 0 The sentencing judge, however,
adjusted the base offense level after considering the illegally seized
210. Id. at 1235. The court described the role of a sentencing judge under the Sentencing
Reform Act as a "codifi[cation of] the traditional purposes of sentencing." Id. (referring to
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), as authority).
211. Id. at 1236-37.
212. Id.
213. 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992).
214. Id. at 64-65.
215. Id. at 65.
216. Id.
217. Id. According to the court, the police uncovered one and one-half kilograms of crack
cocaine at the location. Id. at 66.
218. Id. at 65. It is a well-recognized exception to the exclusionary rule that the prosecution may use evidence seized illegally to impeach a defendant who takes the stand and offers
perjurious testimony. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
219. McCrory, 930 F.2d at 64.
220. Id. at 65.
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cocaine, raising it to thirty-six.2 2 1 As a result of the sentencing
judge's adjustments, McCrory's sentence increased from a range of
27-33 months to 235-293 months in jail. 2
In analyzing whether to extend the exclusionary rule to sentencing determinations, the appellate court emphasized the wide discretion vested in sentencing judges to conduct an inquiry broad
enough in scope to accomplish the purposes of sentencing.2 23 Although this court acknowledged for the first time that the adoption
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines may have altered the need
for information expressed in pre-Guidelines cases like Williams v.
New York, 24 it concluded that "the rationale remains applicable. 2 z25 In addition, the court found that little deterrence would
result from excluding evidence at sentencing.22 According to the
D.C. Circuit, the only situation that might possibly require exclusearch specifision is one in which the police undertake an illegal
22 7
cally to introduce the evidence at sentencing.
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE FROM BASE OFFENSE LEVEL DETERMINATION

The use of illegally seized evidence may dramatically alter the
sentence that a defendant receives under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. By excluding illegally seized evidence from consideration in determining the base offense level, courts would achieve the
purposes that prompted the Sentencing Reform Act by encourag-

221. Id. at 66. In addition to the illegally seized drugs, the government introduced evidence indicating the depth of the defendant's involvement in a major drug distribution
scheme, including two statements by witnesses to his repeated criminal activity. Id. at 6566. The court stated that "[tihis evidence supported a conclusion that appellant's 'relevant
conduct' included his possession with intent to distribute as much as 'a kilo and a half'
seized from Apartment 204. The district court, therefore, set a base offense level of thirtysix in accordance with the requirements of §§ 2D1.1(a)(3) & (c)(3) . . . ." Id. at 66. The
Guidelines authorized an additional increase based upon the presence of a weapon that was
also seized illegally from the apartment. Id.
222. Id. If McCrory had been convicted of all counts for which illegally seized evidence
was taken, his sentencing range would have been 248-295 months in jail. Id.
223. Id. at 68.
224. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
225. McCrory, 930 F.2d at 68. To bolster this position, the court pointed to the adoption
of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) to which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines refer. McCrory, 930
F.2d at 68.
226. McCrory, 930 F.2d at 68-69.
227. Id.
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ing uniformity and honesty in sentencing decisions. Furthermore,
by excluding such evidence from the base offense calculation,
courts would deter law enforcement officials from performing illegal searches for the purpose of increasing sentences.
This proposal recognizes that courts rightfully can use illegally
seized evidence in other distinct ways under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines without affecting the rationale behind the exclusionary rule. Illegally seized evidence could be used to set a point
within a sentencing range once the base offense level has been determined. The evidence also may serve to trigger a departure when
the information suggests that the sentence awarded would be
inadequate. 2 8
Application of the Exclusionary Rule Analysis
Despite recent restrictions upon the reach of the exclusionary
rule,2 2 9 courts still apply the remedy in cases in which the need for
deterrence calls for exclusion of illegally seized evidence.2 30 To decide whether sentencing proceedings require such a remedy, courts
2 3'
have applied the test articulated in United States v. Calandra.
Application of the Calandrabalancing test dictates that the exclusionary rule should govern sentencing proceedings under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 3 2
Under the test that the Supreme Court articulated in Calandra,
the extension of the exclusionary rule would be justified when the
"potential benefits" of excluding illegally seized evidence outweigh
the "potential injury to the historic role and functions"2 3 of the
sentencing court. The adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines dramatically altered the calculation of both the harms and

228. See Bader & Douglas, supra note 10, at 47-56.
229. See, e.g., New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
230. See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 (1990).
231. 414 U.S. 338 (1974); see supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.
232. As noted, the Supreme Court has already ruled once on the use of illegally seized
evidence at sentencing proceedings in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See supra
notes 76-81 and accompanying text. However, the court decided this case before both the
implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the decision in Calandra.As discussed infra, the result since these changes likely would differ.
233. Calandra,414 U.S. at 349.
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benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to sentencing
proceedings.
The historic role of sentencing courts emphasized that the ultimate decision regarding the sentence rested with the sentencing
judge.234 Sentencing decisions were subject to few restrictions other
than a broad range of permissible sentences enacted by the legislature.2 35 In reaching the sentencing decision, a judge freely consid-

ered all information regardless of its source.23 6 Under this indeterminate sentencing system, the exclusion of any source of
information severely restricted the historical role of a sentencing
judge to mete out a sentence freely and alter that sentence as the
defendant's rehabilitation required.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines explicitly rejected this vision
of sentencing. The Guidelines reject discretionary sentencing
whereby each judge must weigh cases individually.237 The refusal
to adopt a pure real offense system under the Guidelines is evidence of this principle. 8 Instead, judges operating under the
Guidelines choose the appropriate sentence by referring to a range
provided by the Guidelines, basing them upon the average sentence received 39 by offenders of the same crime with similar
characteristics.

2

Under the Guidelines, judges retain some discretion to set the
appropriate sentence. This discretion manifests itself in two ways.
First, under certain circumstances, a judge may depart from the
234. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
236. But see United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (stating that a sentence
based upon "misinformation of constitutional magnitude" cannot form the basis of a sentencing decision); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1039 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that
information used in sentencing must be reliable).
237. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
239. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(g) (1991). In addition, some categories reflected a departure from average sentences where Congress had determined that higher sentences reflected
legislative goals. Id. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100
Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988)), imposed both increased and
mandatory sentences for certain drug related offenses. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(g). In all cases,
however, judges no longer determine the appropriate sentencing range for an offense; rather,
Congress makes that selection for each individual offense.
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sentence that the Guidelines impose.2 40 Second, a judge selects the
appropriate sentence within the sentencing range allowable under
the Guidelines.24 1 In both of these limited instances, a sentencing
judge may find a broad range of information useful as an aid in
properly exercising discretion.
The imposition of the Guidelines has reduced the need for the
broad access to all information that characterized the pre-Guidelines sentencing practices. Federal judges need no longer assess a
defendant's capacity for rehabilitation or gauge the defendant's
impact on society from all the circumstances. The refusal to allow
sentencing judges to consider illegally seized evidence in setting
the base offense level therefore would not undermine the historic
role of sentencing judges in the same way it limited the grand
jury's investigative powers in Calandra.
The extension of the exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings
under the Guidelines would achieve a significant deterrent benefit
for the judicial system. Under the pre-Guidelines sentencing
scheme, the use of illegally seized evidence provided the judge with
additional information to assess possibilities for rehabilitation and
determine a sentence. However, because of the unpredictability of
the pre-Guidelines sentencing scheme, the use of illegally seized
evidence did not necessarily result in a higher sentence.2 4 2 As a result, no predictable correlation existed between the sentence im-

240. Under the Guidelines, a court may impose a sentence outside the range which the
applicable guideline established, if there exists "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 p.s. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1988)). See generally United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 747-51 (9th Cir. 1991)
(discussing limits that the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines impose on judicial
departures).
241. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4.
242. Judge Silberman recognized this fact as the basis of the conclusion that the indeterminate scheme provided little incentive for illegal searches. United States v. McCrory, 930
F.2d 63, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J. concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992).
Before promulgation of the sentencing guidelines, this balance tipped toward
admissibility at sentencing of illegally-seized evidence ....
There was thought
to be little deterrent justification for excluding the evidence at the sentencing
phase. In a sense the very arbitrariness in the sentencing process that led to
the promulgation of the guidelines meant that law enforcement officials would
not be likely to seize evidence illegally and then refrain from charging crimes
based upon it and instead introduce that evidence only at sentencing.

1992]

END RUN AROUND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

posed and the amount of illegal contraband found in the accused's
possession.
The Guidelines operate on a completely different premise. Rejecting rehabilitation as the goal of sentencing, the Guidelines aim
to implement sentences reflecting punishment for the behavior at
the heart of the offense. 4 3 As the base offense levels that the Commission designed increase, they reflect higher sentences. 244 As a result, the presentation of illegally seized evidence has a predictable
impact under the Guidelines. The Guideline system creates a direct correlation between sentence length and the quantity of contraband seized by the police. As a result, a new incentive to conduct illegal searches exists. 4 5
Police officers will know that the production of more evidence
after obtaining enough evidence for a conviction will lead to a
greater sentence without risking the initial arrest. Judge Silberman
has argued powerfully that the Guidelines create a new incentive
to conduct illegal searches for purposes of sentencing:
In the post-guidelines world, however, the government's motivation might well be somewhat different, especially when.., the
prosecution has more than enough evidence to convict the defendant on a lesser charge before they conduct the illegal search.
The prosecution will know, based upon the indictment it urges
and the "extra" evidence it has, almost exactly what the sentence will be in the event of conviction because of the guidelines'
mandate that the sentence be increased by a specific number of
offense levels in light of other "relevant conduct" proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. This means the police and prosecution now have something of an incentive to seize evidence
illegally and then introduce that evidence only at the sentencing
phase (unless the exclusionary rule applies at sentencing). If the
police and prosecution know beforehand that they can get a con-

243. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
244. The most striking example of this phenomenon is in the sentencing for drug offenses.
See U.S.S.G. § 2DL.1(c). The base offense level for trafficking drugs increases depending
upon the quantity of drugs involved. For instance, for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
(1988) for trafficking marijuana, the range of base offense levels starts at a low of six for less
than 250 grams of marijuana and reaches a high of 42 for 300,000 kilograms of marijuana.
The resulting sentences range from zero to six months in jail to 360 months to life in jail,
respectively (assuming no prior record).
245. See McCrory, 930 F.2d at 71 (Silberman, J., concurring).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:241

viction on a relatively minor offense which has a broad statutory
sentencing range and that they can guarantee a sentence near
the maximum by seizing other evidence illegally . . . there is
nothing to deter them from seizing the evidence immediately
without obtaining a warrant, especially when a conviction on a
"greater" crime would lead to a similar sentence.'"
In such a situation, the extension of the exclusionary rule has a
deterrent effect upon police behavior by removing any gain that
could possibly flow from the illegal search.24 Excluding illegally
seized evidence from the calculation of the base offense level,
therefore, achieves a significant benefit. 4 8
The incentive that the Guidelines sentencing scheme created
highlights the concerns underlying the decision in Verdugo v.
United States.2 49 Verdugo focused on the need to deter additional
2 50
searches once the police establish the basis for a legal arrest.
Over time, this concern has received less attention because courts
have concluded that police, at the time they conducted searches,
had no idea what impact additional information would have at
251
sentencing.
By creating certainty in the sentencing process, the Guidelines
have reintroduced a lawful and regular purpose for illegally seized
evidence. Although Verdugo has been limited over time, it remains
valuable in confronting law enforcers' deliberate engagement in illegal searches for the purpose of sentence enhancement.25 2 Use of
illegally seized evidence at sentencing clearly encourages searches
geared toward sentence enhancement. Therefore, extending the ex246. Id. at 71.
247. Courts have recognized that the elimination of an incentive to engage in illegal
searches constitutes a proper mechanism to achieve deterrence. See supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text.
248. The facts of McCrory verify this hypothesis. In that case, the inclusion of illegally
seized evidence at sentencing in the calculation of the base offense level resulted in the
defendant's receiving the exact sentence he would have received if he had been convicted of
all the offenses not charged. See supra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
249. 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970); see supra notes 82-90
and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit recently indicated it might be sympathetic to
the exclusionary rule in Guidelines sentencing under certain situations. See United States v.
Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 232 n.11 (7th Cir. 1991).
250. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1975).
252. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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clusionary rule to sentencing proceedings under the Guidelines
would be consistent with the pre-Guidelines treatment of evidence
at sentencing. The extension of the exclusionary rule would result
from the Guidelines' alteration of the incentive structure of illegal
police activity, not from any reworking of the exclusionary rule
itself.
Similar benefit would not result from excluding illegally seized
evidence from the sentencing decisions in which judges maintain
discretion under the Guidelines. The predictability arising when
judges use the illegally seized evidence to calculate the base offense
level does not exist when they use evidence to determine the possi2 53
bility of a departure. First, few instances warrant a departure.
Furthermore, police cannot know in advance the instances that will
lead to a departure because courts determine departure only on a
case-by-case basis.254 Police officers cannot reasonably predict that
evidence from illegal searches will result in a departure. As a result, this extension of the exclusionary rule will not have a deterrent effect on police action.25 5
Likewise, use of illegally seized evidence to select the exact sentence within the appropriate range under the Guidelines presents
less of a threat to the integrity of the sentencing system than use
of the evidence to set the base offense level. The disparity between
the highest and lowest sentences within a particular range can only
be six months or twenty-five percent, whichever is less. 256 As a re253. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(b) (1991). For instance, the Commission believed that departures would be appropriate when a case combined unusual factors not generally associated with a particular offense. The Guidelines state that
[o]f course, an important factor (e.g., physical injury) may infrequently occur
in connection with a particular crime (e.g., fraud). Such rare occurrences are
precisely the type of events that the court's departure powers were designed to
cover-unusual cases outside the range of the more typical offenses for which
the guidelines were designed.
Id.
254. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 p.s. ("Circumstances that may warrant departure from the
guidelines ... cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance. The controlling decision as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted can
only be made by the courts.").
255. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (stating that the exclusionary rule is
restricted to cases in which the law enforcement officer knowingly commits an illegal
search).
256. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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sult, police have little additional incentive to conduct illegal
searches because the amount the sentence can increase is capped.
Furthermore, a judge who fears that a search may be conducted
illegally for the purpose of raising the sentence within the range
maintains discretion to place the sentence at the low end of a particular range.257
The application of the exclusionary rule to the determination of
the base offense level avoids creating a situation in which illegally
seized evidence would be valuable on a large number of occasions.
If illegally seized evidence is admissible in the calculation of the
base offense level, the evidence would be useful in almost every
case in which the government has won a conviction despite the
suppression of some evidence. In James v. Illinois,25 the Supreme
Court warned that when the number of occasions allowing for the
use of illegally seized evidence increases, the value of illegally
seized evidence to the prosecution will rise. 5 9 Extending the exclusionary rule to the calculation of the base offense level would significantly decrease the number of cases in which illegally seized evidence could be used, thereby decreasing the value of illegally
obtained evidence.
Application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The consideration of illegally seized evidence under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines undermines the goals Congress established
for the new sentencing scheme. Congress sought to promote honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing through the
adoption of a determinate sentencing system.26 0 The consideration
of illegally seized evidence in the determination of the base offense
level frustrates the goals Congress established for the sentencing
system under the new Guidelines.
The Guidelines attempt to reduce the level of dishonesty evident
under the pre-Guidelines sentencing structure. "Honesty is easy to

257. See, e.g., United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that the
sentencing court has discretion to place a sentence at the low end of the range), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 885 (1992).
258. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
259. Id. at 318.
260. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A3 (1991).
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achieve: the abolition of parole makes the sentence imposed by the
court the sentence the offender will serve .... ",261 The requirement
that each sentence under the Guidelines include a full explanation
262
of its basis also advances honesty in sentencing.
A new form of dishonesty arguably has emerged under the
Guidelines. The heart of each sentence under the Guidelines is the
base offense level. 26 3 Although the Guidelines consider a broad array of information as relevant conduct for determining the base
offense level in certain situations, the focus remains the conviction
offense.26 4 A sentence based upon the consideration of illegally
seized evidence fails to reflect only the offense for which a defendant has been convicted. 26 5 Although the Guidelines may achieve
the goal of eliminating dishonesty stemming from early release, a
whole new type of deception has emerged. The fundamental principle upon which the legitimacy of sentences rests-that judges impose sentences after convictions for certain offenses-has been
stood on its head by a system that allows illegally seized evidence
to form the basis of a defendant's sentence.2 66 Such a system in
effect punishes behavior for which the defendant has never been
convicted, rather than increasing the sentence for a defendant as a
result of his prior bad actions.2 6 7
The second goal Congress sought in promulgating the Guidelines
was uniformity. Congress' aim was providing similar sentences for

261. Id.
262. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
263. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
264. See United States v. Moreno, 710 F. Supp. 1136, 1137 (E.D. Mich. 1989), aff'd, 899
F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1990).
265. See supra notes 175, 219-22 and accompanying text.
266. This situation merits special concern. Although a fundamental principle of criminal
law holds that the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970), the Guidelines require only a showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that the illegally seized evidence is relevant to the offense of a conviction. See
United States v. Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 492 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 171 (1990).
As a result, sentences may be based almost completely on information not presented at trial
and not subject to the criminal standard of proof. In such cases, the traditional protections
of a criminal defendant's rights-a high burden of proof on the prosecution and the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief-are no longer a hurdle
that the government must cross before imposing a sentence. See Marc Miller & Ronald
Weich, Observations: The Relevant Conduct Controversy, 2 Fed. Sent. Rep. 150, 150 (1989).
267. Miller & Weich, supra note 266, at 150.
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defendants convicted of similar crimes.2 6 Basing the range of
sentences for a particular crime on the pre-Guidelines average for
that offense achieved this purpose in part.2 69 By considering illegally seized evidence in the sentencing decision, courts introduce
into the sentencing process a "wild card" that destroys the uniformity which the Guideline scheme attempted to create.
United States v. McCrory2 70 illustrates this point. In McCrory,
the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to
27
distributeY.
The court based McCrory's conviction upon his sale
of 792 milligrams of cocaine base to an undercover officer.2 72 The
Guidelines recommend a base offense level of sixteen for such an
offense. s In sentencing the defendant, however, the court considered, as part of the defendant's relevant conduct, the illegal discovery of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base.2 74 As a result, the defendant's
275
sentence increased almost ten times.
Although McCrory may be unusual in its severity, 276 its introduction of disparity into the sentencing process is not unusual.
The inevitable result of allowing illegally seized evidence into the
calculation of the base offense level is to destroy consistency in the
sentencing of defendants convicted of identical crimes, who differ
only in that one has been the victim of an illegal search and
seizure. Instead of the conviction offense, the key determinant in
sentence length for many crimes becomes the amount of illegally
seized contraband associated with the defendant. Greater amounts
of illegally discovered contraband bring more severe sentences.

268. Congress attempted to remove disparity in sentencing decisions. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(6) (1988) (stating that one factor to consider in sentencing is "the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct").
269. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A4(g) (1991).
270. 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992).
271. See supra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
272. McCrory, 930 F.2d at 65.
273. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(14). Assuming no other adjustments to the sentence, that
base offense level translates into a sentence ranging from 21 to 27 months in jail.
274. McCrory, 930 F.2d at 66.
275. Based upon this information, the court determined that it should sentence the defendant to between 235-293 months in jail, reflecting a base offense level of 38. Id.
276. In McCrory, the sentence increased from a relatively minor offense (the defendant
whose sentence is 16 months or less may be awarded probation) to one within the sixth
highest sentencing range available under the Guidelines.
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This results in differing sentences for identical convictions, which
is precisely the inconsistency that the Guidelines sought to curtail.
Under the pre-Guidelines system, the chief variable was the sentencing judge's consideration of the defendant's chance at rehabilitation.117 Now, the chief variable is the sentencing judge's consideration of illegally seized evidence. Although the basis for the
exercise of discretion has changed, sentence disparity among similarly situated defendants still remains.
Continued Application of 18 U.S.C. § 3661
Analysis of the rationales for the exclusionary rule and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines points toward the necessity of excluding illegally seized evidence from the determination of the base offense level. Courts ruling on this matter, nonetheless, have
consistently upheld the consideration of illegally seized evidence.
Part of the explanation for judicial uniformity rests upon the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 represents a congressional mandate
to consider this information.
The adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, however, casts doubt on the continued viability
of the statute.
Enacted in 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3661 codified the sentencing practices existing at that time.27 9 The legislative history of the enactment specifically referred to Williams v. New York s0 as a basis for
understanding and interpreting this statute.8 l
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, however, represent a rejection of the Williams indeterminate approach to sentencing.28 2 The
Guidelines specifically adopt a charge offense system of sentencing
that restricts the information that may be considered at sentencing.28 3 Furthermore, the Guidelines specifically depart from rehabilitation as the goal of sentencing. As a result, the basis articu-

277. See Frankel, supra note 118, at 4-6.
278. Cases upholding the use of illegally seized evidence under the Guidelines refer to this
section. See United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 885 (1992); McCrory, 930 F.2d at 68.
279. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
280. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
281. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 131, 147 and accompanying text.
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lated in Williams for considering a broad array of information has
eroded.
The Guidelines expressly prohibit courts from using the broad
grant of authority in 18 U.S.C. § 3661 to consider unlimited information in setting the base offense level.28 4 In failing to follow this
instruction, courts have misinterpreted the incorporation of 18
U.S.C. § 3661 into the Guidelines. Under the pre-Guidelines sentencing system, the statute, in both its explicit language and interpretation by the courts, provided almost no restrictions on the use
of information at sentencing. s5 However, the Guidelines, while
adopting the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 into the new scheme, provided clear limitations on the broad language of the statute. According to section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines, judges were to use the
authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 for two specific purposes: first, as an
aid in selecting a point within a specific guideline range, or, second,
as the basis of a departure."8 " This section of the Guidelines makes
no attempt to apply the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 or the broad
language of Williams to the determination of the base offense
level. Thus, the Guidelines represent a scaling back of the sentencing court's broad discretion to consider all information. As a result,
18 U.S.C. § 3661 cannot serve as a basis for considering illegally
seized evidence in the determination of the base offense level.
CONCLUSION

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines represent an ambitious attempt to redefine the methods and goals of sentencing policy.
Seeking to eliminate the unfettered discretion that characterized
the prior indeterminate sentencing system, the Guidelines' aim was
the promotion of honesty and uniformity in sentencing. The mechanism for achieving these ends was the establishment of a base of-

284. Section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines "distinguishes between factors that determine the
applicable guideline sentencing range (§ 1B1.3) and information that a court may consider
in imposing sentence within that range." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 cmt. The commentary to this note
serves as the basis of interpreting the guideline, and failure to follow it constitutes incorrect
application of the Guidelines, subject to reversal. See id. § 1B1.7 cmt.
285. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988). But see supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing a "fairness, accuracy, and procedural due process" standard used by some courts).
286. U.S.S.G. § 1B.4 cmt.; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) (placing no restrictions on background information considered by courts in determining an appropriate sentence).
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fense level that would, after consideration of other factors, convert
into a sentencing range. Defendants with similar base offense levels
would, under the Guidelines, receive sentences roughly within the
same range.
The consideration of illegally seized evidence in determining a
defendant's base offense level threatens the goals established for
the Guidelines system. The inclusion of illegally seized evidence
undermines honesty in sentencing by severing the relationship between the offense of conviction and the sentence received. Uniformity is threatened because the illegally seized evidence, rather
than the crime of conviction, becomes a vital component in deciding sentence length. As a result, offenders convicted of identical
statutory crimes can receive remarkably different sentences depending upon the amount of illegally seized evidence involved.
The inclusion of illegally seized evidence also offends the principles underlying the exclusionary rule. The adoption of the Guidelines dramatically altered the role of judges in sentencing. Under
the Guidelines, the exclusion of illegally seized evidence would not
inhibit judges from functioning as they did under the pre-Guidelines sentencing scheme. Most importantly, the adoption of the
Guidelines creates a new incentive for police to engage in illegal
searches. Illegal seizures of evidence are rewarded with longer
sentences, even if the evidence is inadmissible at trial. Excluding
illegally seized evidence from the base offense level calculation prevents any gain from these searches and provides a necessary deterrent to illegal searches.
Even under the pre-Guidelines system, courts recognized a need
to deter illegal searches aimed at increasing sentence length. Under
the Guidelines, the impact of presenting illegally seized evidence to
the sentencing court is more certain; therefore, the need for a deterrent is greater. Under the test outlined in Calandra,the need
for a deterrent far outweighs any harm caused by the extension of
the exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
Although commentators have both praised and criticized them,
the Guidelines will remain a fixture in sentencing for the immediate future. To ensure that the Guidelines achieve the goals Congress has mandated, illegally seized evidence should be excluded
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from the calculation of base offense levels under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
A combination of official immunity with official indifference to
employees who violate the Constitution means that the exclusionary rule still has a vital role to play ....

[I]f we do not ap-

ply the exclusionary rule in sentencing under the guidelines, the
constitutional law on unreasonable
searches and seizures will be87
come a parchment barrier.

Victor Jay Miller

287. United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 240 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).

